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Abstract — Among the several backup
authentication mechanisms, authenticating users
with the help of their friends (i.e., trustee-based
social authentication) has been shown to be a
promising backup authentication mechanism. A
user in this system is associated with a few trustees
that were selected from the user’s friends. When the
user wants to regain access to the account, the
service provider sends different verification codes to
the user’s trustees. The user must obtain at least k
(i.e., recovery threshold) verification codes from the
trustees before being directed to reset his or her
password. In this paper, we provide the first
systematic study about the security of trusteebased
social authentications. In particular, we first
introduce a novel framework of attacks, which we
call forest fire attacks. In these attacks, an attacker
initially obtains a small number of compromised
users, and then the attacker iteratively attacks the
rest of users by exploiting trustee-based social
authentications. Then, we construct a probabilistic
model to formalize the threats of forest fire attacks
and their costs for attackers. Moreover, we
introduce various defense strategies. Finally, we
apply our framework to extensively evaluate various
concrete attack and defense strategies using three
real-world social network datasets. Our results have
strong implications for the design of more secure
trustee-based social authentications.
Keywords — Social authentication, security model,
backup
authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most common and traditional technique to
authenticate users is asking passwords. Web services
(e.g., Gmail, Facebook, and online Bankings) today
most commonly rely on passwords to authenticate
users. Unfortunately, two serious issues in this
paradigm are: users will inevitably forget their
passwords, and their passwords could be compromised
and changed by attackers, which result in the failures to
access their own accounts.
Therefore, web services often provide users with
backup authentication mechanisms to help users regain
access to their accounts. Unfortunately, current widely
used backup authentication mechanisms such as
security questions and alternate email addresses are
insecure or unreliable or both. Previous works [5] have
shown that security questions are easily guessable and
phished, and that users might forget their answers to the
security questions. A previously registered alternate
email address might expire upon the user’s change of
school or job. For the above reasons, it is important to
design a secure and reliable backup authentication
mechanism.
Recently, trustee-based social authentication has
attracted increasing attentions and has been shown to be
a promising backup authentication mechanism [4], [7],
[8]. Brainard et al. first proposed trustee-based social
authentication and combined it with other
authenticators (e.g., password, security token) as a two-
factor authentication mechanism. Later, trustee-based
social authentication was adapted to be a backup
authenticator [7], [8]. In particular, Schechter et al.
designed and built a prototype of trustedbased social
authentication system which was integrated into
Microsoft’s Windows Live ID. Schechter et al. found
that trustee-based social authentication is highly
reliable. Moreover, Facebook announced its trustee-
based social authentication system called Trusted
Friends in October, 2011 [8], and it was redesigned and
improved to be Trusted Contacts [7] in May, 2013.
However, these previous work either focus on security
at individual levels [4] or totally ignore security [7], [8].
In fact, security of users is correlated in trustee-based
social authentications, in contrast to traditional
authenticators (e.g., passwords, security questions, and
fingerprint) where security of users are independent.
Specifically, a user’s security in trustee-based social
authentications relies on the security of his or her
trustees; if all trustees of a user are already
compromised, then the attacker can also compromise
him or her because the attacker can easily obtain the
verification codes from the compromised trustees. The
impact of this key difference has not been touched.
Moreover, none of the existing work has studied the
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fundamental design problems such as how to select
trustees for users so that the system is more secure and
how to set the system parameters (e.g., recovery
threshold) to balance between security and usability.
II. OUR WORK
In this paper, we aim to provide the first systematic
study about the security of trustee-based social
authentications. To this end, we first propose a novel
framework of attacks that are based on the observation
that users’ security is correlated in trustee-based social
authentications. In these attacks, an attacker initially
obtains a small number of compromised users which we
call seed users. The attacker then iteratively attacks
other users according to some priority ordering of
them.
In an attack trial to a user Alice, if at least k trustees of
Alice are already compromised, then the attacker can
easily compromise Alice; otherwise the attacker can
(optionally) send spoofing messages to Alice’s
uncompromised trustees to request verification codes,
and such spoofing attacks can succeed with some
probability. Our attacks are similar to forest fires which
start from a few points and spread among the forests.
Thus, we call them forest fire attacks.
Second, we construct a probabilistic model to formalize
the threats of forest fire attacks and their costs for
attackers. For each user, our model computes the
compromise probability that the user is compromised
after a given number of attack iterations. With those
compromise probabilities, our model calculates the
expected number of compromised users and treats it as
the threat. Moreover, our model quantifies the costs of
sending spoofing messages for attackers. Third, we
explore various scenarios where seed users have
different properties and introduce strategies to construct
priority orderings. For instance, one scenario could be
that seed users happen to be appointed as trustees of a
large number of users. Furthermore, we discuss a few
defense strategies. For example, one strategy is to
guarantee that no user is appointed as a trustee of a
large number of users.
Results and Impact of Our Work
We apply our framework to extensively evaluate
various concrete attack scenarios, defense strategies,
and the impact of system parameters using three real-
world social networks. First, we find that forest fire
attack is a potential big threat. In particular, when all
the users with at least 10 friends in these social
networks adopt trustee-based social authentications, an
attacker can compromise tens of thousands of users in
some cases even if the number of seed users is 0; using
a small number (e.g., 1,000) of seed users, the attacker
can further compromise two to three orders of
magnitude more users with low (or even no) costs of
sending spoofing messages. Second, our defense
strategy, which guarantees that no users are selected as
trustees by too many other users, can decrease the
expected number of compromised users by one to two
orders of magnitude and increase the costs for attackers
by a few times in some cases. Third, we find that, in
contrast to existing work [1] where the recover
threshold is set to be three, it could be set to be four to
better balance between security and usability.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
 We propose a novel framework of attacks, which
we call forest fire attacks.
 We construct a model to formalize the threats of
forest fire attacks and their costs for attackers.
Moreover, we explore various attack scenarios and
defense strategies.
 We apply our framework to extensively evaluate
these attack scenarios, defense strategies, and the
impact of system parameters using three real-world
social networks.
Our results have strong implications for designing more
secure trustee-based social authentications.
III. BACKGROUND
First, we overview how a trustee-based social
authentication system works. Then, we introduce two
basic concepts, i.e., social networks and trustee
networks.
A. Trustee-Based Social Authentications
A trustee-based social authentication includes two
phases:
 Registration Phase. The system prepares trustees
for a user Alice in this phase. Specifically, Alice is
first authenticated with her main authenticator (i.e.,
password), and then a few (e.g., 5) friends, who
also have accounts in the system, are selected by
either Alice herself or the service provider from
Alice’s friend list and are appointed as Alice’s
trustees.
 Recovery Phase. When Alice forgets her password
or her password was compromised and changed by
an attacker, she recovers her account with the help
of her trustees in this phase. Specifically, Alice
first sends an account recovery request with her
username to the service provider which then shows
Alice an URL. Alice is required to share this URL
with her trustees. Then, her trustees authenticate
themselves into the system and retrieve verification
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codes using the given URL. Alice then obtains the
verification codes from her trustees via emailing
them, calling them, or meeting them in person. If
Alice obtains a sufficient number (e.g., 3) of
verification codes and presents them to the service
provider, then Alice is authenticated and is directed
to reset her password. We call the number of
verification codes required to be authenticated the
recovery threshold.
Note that it is important for Alice to know who her
trustees are in the Recovery Phase. Schechter et al.
showed that users cannot remember their trustees via
performing user studies. Thus, a usable trustee-based
social authentication system should remind Alice of her
trustees.
B. Social Networks and Trustee Networks
We denote a social network as G = (V, E), where each
node in V corresponds to a user in the service and an
undirected edge (u, v) represents that users u and v are
friends. Moreover, in a trustee-based social
authentication system, users and their trustees form a
directed network. We call this directed network a
trustee network and denote it as GT = (VT , ET ),
where a node in VT is a user in the service and a
directed edge (v, u) in ET means v is a trustee of u. One
fundamental challenge in trustee-based social
authentication is how to construct the trustee network
from a social network so that the system is more secure.
IV. THREAT MODEL
We first introduce attackers’ background knowledge
and then a novel family of attacks which we call forest
fire attacks.
A. Background Knowledge
We assume that attackers know the trustee network in
the target service. The reasonableness of this threat
model is supported by two evidences. First, attackers
can obtain users’ usernames. A username is usually a
string of letters, digits, and special characters.
Moreover, Bonneau et al. [3] showed that a majority
(e.g., 96% in their studies) of websites enable attackers
to probe if a string is a legitimate username. Thus,
strong attackers, who have enough resources (e.g., a
botnet) to perform username probings, can obtain all
usernames in the target service. Second, Schechter et al.
found, via performing user studies, that users cannot
remember their own trustees. Therefore, a usable
trustee-based social authentication system must remind
users of their trustees. Recall that an account recovery
request only requires a username. As a result, an
attacker could send account recovery requests with the
collected usernames to the service provider which
reminds the attacker of the trustees of each user.
Next, we take Facebook as an example to show how an
attacker obtains the trustee network. First, Facebook
provides an interface1 to test if a user (represented by a
username, real name, or email address) is in Facebook.
Thus, the attacker can perform username probings to
collect Facebook users. Second, the attacker sends
account recovery requests to Facebook using the
collected names. Recall that Facebook shows all
trustees to a user once the user correctly types in one
trustee. Moreover, Bilge et al. [4] showed that an
attacker can obtain friend lists of around 90% of
Facebook users. Thus, the attacker can repeatedly guess
the trustees of a user until success. We note that
Facebook only allows a user to try around 10 times for
typing in the trustees within a short period of time.
However, such rate limit cannot prevent a strong
attacker from obtaining the trustee network eventually,
though it can increase the attacker’s cost.
B. Forest Fire Attacks
Our forest fire attacks consist of Ignition Phase and
Propagation Phase.
1) Ignition Phase: In this phase, an attacker obtains a
small number of compromised users which we call seed
users. They could be obtained from phishing attacks,
statistical guessing’s, and password database leaks, or
they could be a coalition of users who collude each
other. Indeed, a large number of social network
accounts were reported to be compromised, showing
the feasibility of obtaining compromised seed users.
2) Propagation Phase: Given the seed users, the
attacker iteratively attacks other users. In each attack
iteration, the attacker performs one attack trial to each
of the uncompromised users according to some attack
ordering of them. In an attack trial to a user u, the
attacker sends an account recovery request with u’s
username to the service provider, which issues different
verification codes to u’s trustees. The goal of the
attacker is to obtain verification codes from at least k
trustees. If at least k trustees of u are already
compromised, the attacker can easily compromise u;
otherwise, the attacker can impersonate u and send a
spoofing message to each uncompromised trustee of u
to request the verification code. Schechter et al. found
that such spoofing attacks can successfully retrieve a
verification code with an average probability around
0.05.
Although the spoofing attacks can help attackers
compromise more users, we want to stress that they are
optional. We will show in our experiments that an
attacker can still compromise a large number of users
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even if he does not use spoofing attacks to retrieve
verification codes in some cases.
3) Example: Figure 1 shows a forest fire attack to a
service with 6 users. Note that a good attack ordering
can increase the probability that users are compromised
and decrease the number of required spoofing
messages. In our example, if the attacker performs
attack trials with an attack ordering of u5, u6, u4, the
attacker needs to spoof both u4 and u6 to compromise
u5, which requires two spoofing messages. However,
with the attack ordering of u6, u5, u4, the attacker only
needs to spoof u4 to compromise u5, which only
requires one spoofing message and could succeed with
a higher probability.
4) Compromised Users could be Recovered:
Users could recover their compromised accounts to be
uncompromised after they or the service provider detect
suspicious activities of the accounts. For instance, a
trustee of u receiving a spoofing message might report
to u, who then changes his or her password; the
phenomenon that a trustee requests lots of verification
codes for different users within a short period of time is
a possible indicator of forest fire attacks, and the
service provider could then notify the users, whose
trustees have requested verification codes, to change
passwords. Moreover, a recovered account could be
compromised again in future attack iterations, e.g.,
when the trustees of the recovered user are still
compromised. The process of being compromised and
being recovered could repeat for many attack iterations.
(a) Ignition Phase
(b) Propagation Phase
V. RELATED WORK
A. Social Authentications
Depending on how friends are involved in the
authentication process, social authentications can be
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classified into trusteebased and knowledge-based social
authentications. In trusteebased social authentications
[4], the selected friends aid the user in the
authentication process. Knowledge-based social
authentication, however, asks the user questions about
his or her selected friends, and thus friends are not
directly involved.
Trustee-Based Social Authentication Systems:
Authentication is traditionally based on three factors:
something you know (e.g., a password), something you
have (e.g., a RSA SecurID), and something you are
(e.g., fingerprint). Brainard et al. [4] proposed to use the
fourth factor, i.e., somebody you know, to authenticate
users. We call the fourth factor trustee-based social
authentication. Originally, Brainard et al. combined
trustee-based social authentication with some other
factor as a two-factor authentication mechanism. It was
later adapted to be a backup authenticator [7], [8]. For
instance, Schechter et al. [2] designed and built a
prototype of trustee-based social authentication system
which was integrated into Microsoft’s Windows Live
ID system. Moreover, Facebook designed Trusted
Friends in October, 2011 [8], and it was improved to be
Trusted Contacts [7] in May, 2013.
Knowledge-Based Social Authentication Systems:
Such social authentications are still based on something
you know. Yardi et al. [9] proposed a knowledge-based
authentication system based on photos to test if a user
belongs to the group (e.g., interest groups in Facebook)
that he or she tries to access. Facebook recently
launched a similar photo-based social authentication
system [10], in which Facebook shows a few photos of
a friend of a user and asks the user to name the friend.
Such system essentially relies on the knowledge that the
user knows the person in the shown photos. However,
recent work has shown, via theoretical modeling [12]
and empirical evaluations [11], that photo-based social
authentications are not resilient to various attacks such
as automatic face recognition techniques, questioning
their use as a backup authentication mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide the first systematic study
about the security of trustee-based social
authentications. First, we introduce forest fire attacks.
In these attacks, an attacker first obtains a small number
of compromised seed users and then iteratively attacks
the rest of users according to a priority ordering of
them. Second, we construct a probabilistic model to
formalize the threats of forest fire attacks and their
costs for attackers. Third, we introduce a few strategies
to select seed users and construct priority orderings, and
we discuss various defense strategies. Fourth, via
extensive evaluations using three real-world social
network datasets, we find that forest fire attack is a
potential big threat. For instance, with a small number
(e.g., 1,000) of seed users, an attacker can further
compromise two to three orders of magnitude more
users in some scenarios with low (or even no) costs of
sending spoofing messages. However, our defense
strategy, which guarantees that no users are trustees of
too many other users, can decrease the number of
compromised users by one to two orders of magnitude
and increase the costs for attackers by a few times in
some cases. Moreover, the recovery threshold should be
set to be 4 to better balance between security and
usability.
A few future directions include evaluating forest firest
attacks on real social authentication systems such as
Facebook’s Trusted Contacts, designing new attack and
defense strategies, and optimizing forest fire attacks
given a time constraint.
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